Brigadier-General Christopher Oluwole Rotimi, first
Military Governor of Western State from 1971 -75 and former Nigerian Ambassador
to the U.S. turned 80 last Friday and had quiet celebration at his Agodi,
Ibadan home. He spoke with Anote
Ajeluorou on national political issues, including revisiting the coups of
1966 and their implications, the shifted polls and why the military should
remain neutral
It’s your birthday, but it’s so quiet here. Why is there
no activity to mark it?
My style has always been distinctly different
from other people. To quite some extent, I’m an introvert. I’m not gregarious;
that doesn’t mean I don’t have friends. As a matter of fact, I’ve been
receiving telephone calls since morning; the first came at 6am from someone in
Senegal. So I asked him, ‘didn’t you sleep?’ So, he said before he did
anything, he felt he must congratulate me first.
In any case, what I decided I will do for my
80th is to have a small get-together with members of my family and a few friends.
And we are doing the celebration in Lagos at a first class restaurant, with
about 50, 60 guests on the invitation list. I prefer it that way; I have not
invited governors, top politicians because in my own way I’m not entirely happy
with the way they are running the country. That is the way I feel. I talk to
them but certain expectations of one have not been met and I feel disappointed.
I’ve
had occasion in the past to speak to some of them but I discover that it’s like
a dialogue of the deaf. You speak to these people and somehow, people you know
are reasonable have had power gone into their heads, and they are behaving
left, right and centre. Today, we have a situation whereby civilian governors
are worse than soldiers, from the point of view of impunity. They do whatever
they like and the laws are discarded at whims.
Can you mention particular instances of impunity?
Take the PDP, for instance, of
which I have an insider knowledge, as a former member. In fact, they even
appointed me as BoT member. I just discarded them; I told them I was not
interested.
So, you’re not like Obasanjo, who the other day, publicly
tore his PDP membership card?
No; I’ve shunned them. Look, in a
constitutional democracy, there are divisions of power and the constitution
states it very clearly that you have the executive, the judiciary and the
legislature. Now, these are very vital institutions of state. What has happened
in Nigeria is that the executive is constantly overstepping its bound into
legislative matters. The judiciary is consistently being undermined. I’m not referring
to any particular regime, but this is what has been consistently happening in Nigeria
since 1999. Now, today the military, without their knowing, is being invited or
being allowed to take part in executive authority.
In what sense is that?
You know what Sambo Dasuki, said in London
was beyond his remit. A National Security Adviser is an adviser to the
president. If he has any advice to give he must give it to his president, who
appointed him. The NSA has no executive authority outside advising the
president; he has nothing to do with INEC. He took that step either wittingly
or unwittingly, I don’t know. Now, he came back to Nigeria and with election
timetable and everything already set and there were political maneuverings and
he wrote a letter to the head of INEC, saying that the military will not be
able to support the elections because of security reasons. Now, I’m talking as
a former soldier. When you have a national assignment imposed on you by the
constitution, and you’re not able to fulfill that role you get out. Somebody
else will do it more appropriately. For goodness sake, what he did was
interference in political affairs. You get me? He has no remit to interfere.
The armed forces must maintain their integrity and make sure that they are neutral
because the armed forces are not for one political party or the other.
Now, they have maneuvered the military to
appear to be taking sides in a political contest. It’s dangerous. It’s
dangerous for the country. You see, whoever rides the tiger, one day the tiger
is going to chop him, too. That is danger for the military, too; they may think
it all wise now. No; it doesn’t work that way. If you ride a tiger, the day you
dismount from that tiger it will chop you off. Leave the military out of party politics
completely!
It’s true that the military leaders were
appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, but the military, by the constitution,
have their own remit. If a president gives what amounts to an illegal
instruction to a military man, his response will be, ‘yes, sir; but look at
what the law says. Look at what the constitution says’. If they say they want
to sack him, so be it? So what? For
everybody in life, there will be life after whatever you currently are.
Going a little back, you joined the army with your two
eyes open, having bagged a university degree like Odumegwu Ojukwu, Ifeajuna and
others. After the 1966 coup ventured into the political into the political
arena and then you played a major role thereafter by being governor of Western
State. Can you honestly say your generation laid a solid foundation for the
country?
Let me start this way. The coup of January
1966 was unfortunate; it was also needless. It was a gamble that a few, five,
six majors took because they wanted to change Nigeria. Yes, they wanted to
change Nigeria, but you don’t have the constitutional role to change Nigeria.
You’re acting outside the constitution obviously when you now seize power. But
to answer your question, in January 1966 there were two coups; it was a coup
within a coup. Ifeajuna headed the team to handle the South. Nzeogwu handled
the team to deal with the North, and he carried out his coup very cleanly, as
planned, to get rid of all the most important political leaders in the North
and the top ranking military.
That coup was not conclusive at the
beginning. One of the things that still intrigues me till today is, how did Major
General Aguyi Ironsi escape the fate that befell the other officers? It
intrigues me; I can’t get the answer because the coup boys, having taken a
decision to rid the top military and politicians, how did Ironsi escape being
dealt with. He was the General Officer Commander of the Nigerian Army. How?
What happened? But when Ironsi survived the coup of the majors, he described
what was clearly a coup, an attempt to overthrow a legitimate government of
Nigeria, as mutiny. And if it was mutiny, as he told the remnants of the
politicians that were still in Lagos, all he needed to do was to put down the
mutiny and for government to continue.
Having told them it was a mutiny he took over
government. As a matter of fact, from what we knew, Nwafor Orizu, then Senate
President at the time suggested to him that since we can’t account for the
premiers of the West, North, the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, why can’t you
invite the most senior minister to take over the government? Ironsi, I was
told, said he couldn’t guarantee the safety of Inuwa Wada, who was the most
senior in the cabinet at that time. Ironsi and his advisers said no. And that
was how he took over government.
Another thing that intrigues me about the
coup is, how come that Michael Opara in the East was spared, Osadebe in the
Mid-West was spared; but they dealt with Akintola here. Ifeajuna did not do a
perfect job. And that lend credence to the fact that it was an Igbo coup, which
the military boys bought line, hook and sinker. ‘If this is an Igbo coup, ok,
we will wait, and at our own time we will strikes because the army had become
divided. At the time, I was Deputy Quarter Master-General in Lagos. When I was
posted to Enugu, I got wind of a revenge coup in the offing.
Ironsi, in June, started visits to the
regional capitals. Ironsi promulgated a decree unifying the federal civil
service; that day when I listened to that broadcast, I said to myself, ‘this is
the end of this man’. Yes, unitarism will never work in the kind of
heterogeneous society we have in Nigeria. An Isoko man will never be a Yoruba
man; we have our own culture; you have your own. A Tiv person will never be
Hausa.
Why didn’t the subsequent military government reverse Ironsi’s
unitarism when they took over power?
That decree was dealing with the civil
service. It meant that you could post an Igbo man, as a divisional officer to,
say, Sokoto. You could post somebody from Delta to Kano; civil service top
hierarchy was full of Igbo people and Hausa/Fulani saw it as domination of
Nigeria. They saw it as planning domination of Nigeria through the civil
service. Signs had been given that this was an Igbo coup; I don’t believe
myself that Nzeogwu wanted an Igbo coup; but Ifeajuna, I couldn’t trust him. I
told you we trained together; we travelled to Zaria and London together; we
were in the same battalion. I knew him very well. I couldn’t trust him; Ifeajuna
had always had ideas about power in his head.
As a matter of fact and before that January
coup happened, I saw certain movement of officers in Lagos, which put me on
notice. Certain officers, who were not my friends, started visiting me when I
was at Yaba Barrack. There was a particular Yoruba officer, who was junior to
me; he was the emissary of the coup makers to bring me in. So, Adegboyega, who
was one of them, came twice to visit me when I was not home. The third time he
came he met me, and I said, ‘what do you want in my place? You’ve never visited
me before’. He then intimated me there was going to be a meeting of the boys at
Takwa Bay. And I said, ‘get out of my place; I won’t be part of any insurrection’.
But in addition, in October 1965, government
got wind from intelligence service that there was going to be a rebellion in
the army. I understood the Prime Minister called Ironsi and told him. But
Ironsi denied it, that he was in charge of the army. Subsequently, Ironsi
called a meeting of all officers in the Lagos area and was lecturing us on
loyalty to the government. Of course, we didn’t ask any questions. He was the
GOC; he said what he wanted to say and he left. He also brought with him
Brigadier Mai Malari, Brigade Commander in Apapa and Ade William, Brigade
Commander from Kaduna. I went to Ade William and asked him, ‘sir, I don’t
understand the import of the GOC’s lecture to us today’. He said he, too,
didn’t understand it because he didn’t discuss what he was going to tell us
before he spoke. I said, ‘ok, sir, if you too didn’t understand. Who am I.’ I
was only a major, anyway.
That was how things played round and round until
the July thing now happened when Ironsi got here in Ibadan. Danjuma was on
Ironsi’s entourage. Danjuma had served in the battalion in Ibadan here; he was
very familiar with the terrain. He was in A-Branch, Adjutant Officers Branch.
He was still in Ironsi’s entourage. Here he was in Ironsi’s entourage, could he
really claim that he didn’t know all that happened that night? And they seized
Ironsi; Fajuyi insisted he would go with them because Ironsi was his guest and
that wherever they were taking him he would go. And they drove them off and
killed them at Iwo Road; they shot them there. All these things show
involvement. So, that was Danjuma; he played his own role there.
So, it was; Igbo coup in January;
Hausa/Fulani coup in July. But even beyond that and after Ironsi was killed,
there were other senior officers to Gowon. Robert Adebayo was far senior to Gowon;
Ogundipe was senior to Adebayo. Ogundipe was Chief of Staff to Ironsi. Adebayo
was on a course in England, but he came home briefly and it coincided with the counter-coup.
Adebayo was my predecessor; I took over from him here in Ibadan as governor.
Even Ejoor in Benin City was senior to Gowon. Ojukwu and Gowon were about the
same date of entry into the army; he resisted Gowon being Head of State. He
said whatever has happened and since Ironsi was nowhere to be found, the next
most senior must take over. But the coup makers weren’t going to accept
Ogundipe; he gave orders in the early hours of the counter-coup and soldiers
wouldn’t listen to him. That was how Ogundipe said ‘the matter is out of
control; I must get out of this place’. That was why Gowon, whom I have
tremendous resprespect for, claimed recently that when the July 1966 coup
happened the boys wanted him to take over. The question is, who are the boys?
Did it include the rest of us, leaving the Igbo officers aside who had gone to
East because of the pogrom? How about we the Yoruba officers, did he consult
us? Of course, he didn’t. The ‘boys’ meant officers from the North. That’s half
truth; I couldn’t buy that. Why don’t you come up and say the boys from the
North insisted you take over and you did.
But in spite of that, the Yoruba still gave
Gowon a lot of support. I’m one of those who always say that without the Yoruba
support there was no way Gowon would have succeeded in this country. And I
maintain that stand; the country would have split completely. That was what
Awolowo went to tell Ojukwu not to let his people go because the West would
follow. But we gave all the support and we sustained this country. The Northern
soldiers could not have fought the civil war and be successful the way they did
without the support of the West, both politically and militarily.
A new book, Corruption
in Africa: Resolution through New Diagnosis and argues that Nigeria is now
a G-2 Security Council member country, an alliance between the Hausa/Fulani and
Yoruba, to rule the country in Roman empire-like style, and Jonathan is a
regent who must be made to give back power to its owners. What do you make of
that?
It’s a complicated situation. Let’s start
from Obasanjo; the ascendancy of Jonathan was with the full support of Obasanjo.
Obasanjo’s argument is that the time he supported him he felt convinced that it
would be a good thing for Nigerian unity to have somebody from the minority to
head Nigeria. I don’t think we can argue against that; it would have brought
unity more to know that every Nigerian can lead and you don’t have to be
Hausa/Fulani to ascend to the highest office in the land. That was a good
argument.
But at the same time, I have told my friend
Obasanjo at the beginning of that exercise that it would likely be an exercise
in futility. I didn’t buy into it. Character matters in leadership. I try to
look at the profile of this man; I didn’t think he had what it takes to carry
the heavy weight that will be reposed in him. I now brought him to the interim
government of 1993 when Babangida had exhausted all his tricks to remain in
power and appointed Earnest Shonekan, who came to power in August 1993. I told
Obasanjo that Shonekan was a mistake; that he could not carry the weight of
this office; that he didn’t have the character of a leader to hold office. I
told him Shonekan couldn’t do it; that he hadn’t political exposure; that we
need a strong man to do it. Obasanjo advised Shonekan to quickly take
far-reaching steps with the army, but he didn’t. What happened?
It’s
beyond being very fair. Let me tell you something. The military is a very
powerful institution in this country because they have been allowed to grow
their wings. There are some very rich soldiers today, former and serving. Some
of them are worse than the politicians; we need somebody who is strong, who
knows military mentality as well.
Must the person necessarily be a military man as well?
Oh, no; he mustn’t be a military man. He could
be a civilian as well. But that is the man you need to govern Nigeria. He has
to be strong; he has to be dedicated and he has to give his life to this
nation. If you think you’re going to rule Nigeria without being firm, you’re
putting yourself at risk. Most of our systems are still very fragile; you need
a strong person whether a civilian or military it doesn’t matter. But he has to
give his life; that is where Murtala Muhammed comes in.
But Murtala came in by the act of undermining the
constitution, an act of corruption?
No, no; I’m not saying he was the best. Let
me tell you, Murtala, rightly, wrongly, he got there. He was a strong man;
people knew him for that. He acted rather rashly, mind you. But if he was
convinced about something he was ready to bulldoze his way through.
Even without following due process?
Yes, he didn’t mind. The way he fought the
civil war was different from the way Adekunle did in Rivers areas. The way
Muhammed Shuwa handled the North was different. Murtala was completely
unorthodox.
But he actually ought to be prosecuted for war crimes for
his war records in Asaba in his bloodletting orgies?
Yes; but he’s not alive today. But what I’m
saying is that he was very unorthodox. He didn’t listen to anybody, whether
from Lagos or from anywhere. But the point I’m trying to make is that Murtala
had made up his mind the way he thought Nigeria should go and he pursued it
with singular determination. But I knew there were forces that would neutralize
him, particularly in the same military. By the time he took over in the July
coup of 1975, there were pockets of resistance because Gowon still had
supporters in the military, and who were prepared to do Murtala in? They were
from the Middle Belt, where Gowon came from and not Hausa/Fulani where Murtala
came from. I used to say that ‘this man you’re going to hit your head against a
wall the way you’re going’. In Nigeria you may know what is wrong, but how you
proceed about it is as important as your knowledge of what is wrong. Murtala
was ready to bulldoze his way through everything.
But some would argue that Jonathan is going the opposite
way of Murtala…
No; it’s also the wrong method. Look, Gowon reigned
for nine years. How did he succeed? Gowon started building coalition around
himself and his government. When the civil servants advised him to bring
Awolowo from prison and make him Minister of Finance and Deputy Head of the
Supreme Military Council, it was a very sound advice. By that he aggregated
Yoruba support to himself. When he went to the North he did the same – Dikko,
Aminu Kano; in the East, he picked some people. He picked Briggs, a Rivers man.
That was how he succeeded in building a political coalition for his executive
council. Amongst the military he started building coalition of Yoruba officers
to support him. Hence people like Olutoye, myself, Obasanjo, Adekunle,
Akinrinade.
So, when would Nigeria be free from the shadow of the military,
from Obasanjo in eight years and now Buhari jostling for power, with Obasanjo
rooting for him, so much so that Nigeria now seems doomed to a military fate?
Nigeria, for me, is in a transition. We
haven’t come to any definite end to know where we’re going. But we must
continue to work the system. That is why I’m saying that let’s get a leader who
understands Nigeria as it is; Nigeria as it ought to be and work out a
strategy. The man there can consult people, but unless you’ve got somebody who
is able to sit down and seriously examine Nigeria in all its ramifications, you
will be wasting our time.
If you were saddled with that responsibility, what will be
your strategy?
In a way, I feel sorry for Jonathan. He’s not
reaching out to critical areas of the Nigerian public where he can tap ideas.
There are people in Nigeria who are not partisan; I don’t want to start
mentioning names, but they are there. You must reach out to them. Leave your
aides aside; they will never tell you the truth. They will never tell you the
truth because they are profiting from what is going on. As an individual, you
must reach out.
When I became governor I turned to people who
had nothing to do with government like Chief Awolowo. I said I recognised him
as a leader. He linked me with Abraham Adesanya, but he declined. He later
recommended Olaniwu Ajayi; I went into the university, people who were not
involved in party politics. I did not leave the obas out; I approached Sir Aderemi Adeyemi, Ooni of Ife, and asked to bring his son in England, who was my
classmate at Kings College. A leader must know his society and tap into areas
where he can get sound advice. Tell me, what grassroots support does a soldier
have? It’s zero. We live all our lives in the barracks; they didn’t used to mix
up with civilians like they do now. We lived our lives in officers’ mess. So,
that is one of the areas; reach to critical areas of the populace; leave your
advisers alone. That is how to build coalition to support your government.
Some described the election postponement as coup against
democracy. Do you also believe so?
Don’t you think so? Yes! That’s why I’m
saying the military should not lend itself to be used. The constitution is very
clear; the National Security Adviser is an adviser to the president. An NSA has
no business with the INEC. Constitutionally, INEC is an independent body. When
Jonathan went to the Council of State, it was sound advice. He got some advice
from there. Then the NSA turned round to give INEC letter. This is manipulation.
The service heads must know that they have a sacred duty to Nigeria, even
within the constitution. A Commander-in-Chief is a C-in-C, no doubt about that.
The C-in-C is wearing many hats – the political hat, security hat, economic
hat; he has been imbued with enormous powers and responsibilities that he’s
carrying. He must understand them and know how to use them to the benefit of
the nation.
How can a C-in-C tell me that he doesn’t know
what is going on. No.
I asked earlier, do you think the foundation your
generation of leaders laid was the right one for Nigeria?
Let me tell you, the adventure of 1966 was
ill-considered. Here was the military that had no training beyond ruling in the
barracks. The way and manner you rule your barracks is different from the way
you rule your towns and cities. When you look at military law, when a soldier
offends, the Sergeant-Major marches him before the Company Commander or
Battalion Commander: ‘left right, left right; stop! Salute’. ‘You’re accused of
bla bla bla; guilty or not?’ ‘Guilty’ or if he says, ‘not guilty’; he gets
‘rubbish; seven days in confinement!’ He is then marched out. That is military;
they have no time for the excuses you’re giving. The man is pronounced guilty
before he is even heard. Once you’re charged you’re guilty. You won’t say your Sergeant-Major
is telling lies; you can’t challenge authority.
The issue is, we’re in this transition and
things will go on for quite some time. The military have tried their best the
way they know how to do things. But even the things the military did, was it
not civilians who advised them or misadvised them?
When you say we’re in a transition, would you then say
that Nigerians have been impatient with their leaders in development strides
made so far?
They are not impatient; in fact, they have
been very tolerant. We have a great country in our hands. It’s a pity we’re
mishandling it. In other countries there will be popular uprising as a result
of what our leaders have done. But Nigerians are so tolerant, and because of
that our leaders use division to weaken the people; hence politics of tribe,
politics of religion. There’s downright lack of conscience; lack of conscience
in our leaders. If a Nigerian leader, who was a nobody gets there, who
yesterday had no shoes, today his is wearing Italian shoes; he forgets what he
had been before. What I‘m saying is that leaders must understand the nature of
responsibility that God has put on them. Leaders are shepherds of the people and
a lot is expected of them. That is why when you’re a leader you give yourself,
your life is no longer yours. You must think less of yourself than all the
sheep that you’re leading. Look at the accumulation of wealth; at 80 I can say
I know some sacred truth about life. If God calls me tomorrow, what am I going
to take back to him? The same way I was born naked I will go to him, no matter
what they wear on me. Ants and maggots will feast on you. I’m not saying people
should not provide the necessities of life, look after the family and all that.
But there are some Nigerians who don’t need the money they have today, which is
at the expense of the people for whom they hold it in trust. Greed has seized
the soul of our leaders and they are fighting. We see how they play politics in
other places; is that the case with us? We kill ourselves; we’re encouraging
divisions. To do what? To steal. This is what is going on.
Quotes:
1. Oh, no; he
mustn’t be a military man. He could be a civilian as well. But that is the man
you need to govern Nigeria. He has to be strong; he has to be dedicated and he
has to give his life to this nation. If you think you’re going to rule Nigeria
without being firm, you’re putting yourself at risk. Most of our systems are
still very fragile; you need a strong person whether a civilian or military it
doesn’t matter. But he has to give his life; that is where Murtala Muhammed
comes in.
2.
Nigeria, for me, is
in a transition. We haven’t come to any definite end to know where we’re going.
But we must continue to work the system. That is why I’m saying that let’s get
a leader who understands Nigeria as it is; Nigeria as it ought to be and work
out a strategy. The man there can consult people, but unless you’ve got
somebody who is able to sit down and seriously examine Nigeria in all its
ramifications, you will be wasting our time.
3.
In a way, I feel sorry for Jonathan. He’s not
reaching out to critical areas of the Nigerian public where he can tap ideas.
There are people in Nigeria who are not partisan; I don’t want to start mentioning
names, but they are there. You must reach out to them. Leave your aides aside;
they will never tell you the truth. They will never tell you the truth because
they are profiting from what is going on. As an individual, you must reach out.
4.
A leader must know
his society and tap into areas where he can get sound advice. Tell me, what
grassroots support does a soldier have? It’s zero. We live all our lives in the
barracks; they didn’t used to mix up with civilians like they do now. We lived
our lives in officers’ mess. So, that is one of the areas; reach to critical
areas of the populace; leave your advisers alone. That is how to build
coalition to support your government.